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ATTORNEYS' MALPRACTICE POLICIES:
REGULATORY EXCLUSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY
Susan Saab Fortney*
The courts have yet to decide the issue of the
enforceability of provisions in legal malpractice
insurance policies that specifically exclude from
coverage claims made by government regulators
such as the FDIC. The question has reached the
courts with respect to such exclusionary provisions
in directors' and officers' liability insurance poli-
cies, and here the courts are split. The author dis-
cusses the current case law and the statutory devel-
opments.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is
on a mission. Facing billions of dollars in losses from failed fi-
nancial institutions, the FDIC has mounted an offensive to re-
cover the losses from officers, directors, attorneys, accoun-
tants, and other persons who performed services for the
institutions. In this effort, the FDIC has targeted attorneys.'
As a result, legal malpractice insurers have experienced a vir-
tual explosion of claims.
In response to the avalanche of claims against attorneys,
legal malpractice insurers have sought to limit their exposure.
These insurers have followed the lead of insurers that issued
directors' and officers' liability policies containing exclusion-
ary provisions, commonly referred to as FDIC exclusions or
regulatory exclusions. These policy provisions specifically ex-
cluded claims made by government regulators such as the
* Of counsel to the firm of Long, Burner, Parks, & Sealy, P.C., Austin, Tex. Currently, she
is a J.S.D. candidate at Columbia University School of Law.
1 See France, "Savings & Loan Lawyers," 77 A.B.A.J. 52, 55 (1991) (referring to 150 law-
suits against former counsel to failed thrifts); Kawasaki, "Liability of Attorneys, Accoun-
tants, Appraisers and Other Independent Contractors Under the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989," 42 Hastings L.J., 249, 267 (1990) (noting
that the Bush administration has dictated a "get tough" philosophy on attorneys).
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FDIC and the now-defunct Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation (FSLIC).
Despite express exclusionary language in the directors'
and officers' liability policies, the FDIC and FSLIC chal-
lenged the regulatory exclusions. The regulators claimed that
the exclusions were unenforceable because they were con-
trary to public policy. A number of trial courts have ruled on
the validity of regulatory exclusions under directors' and offi-
cers' liability policies. Some courts have been persuaded by
the FDIC's myriad arguments and have declared that the reg-
ulatory exclusions are unenforceable because they contra-
vene public policy. Other courts have held that no public pol-
icy abrogates the regulatory exclusions.
To date, there has been no reported decision on regula-
tory exclusions in legal malpractice policies. Therefore, the
only guidance on the enforceability of such exclusions is the
case law on regulatory exclusions in directors' and officers' li-
ability policies. After discussing the current case law and
statutory developments affecting directors' and officers' lia-
bility policies, this article will consider the applicability of
public policy arguments to legal malpractice policies. Finally,
the article will discuss the consequences of judicial rewriting
of the policies to both insured attorneys and their clients.
Case Law on Regulatory Exclusions in Directors'
and Officers' Liability Policies
As noted, there is a split of authority on the issue of en-
forceability of regulatory exclusions in insurance policies. An
analysis of the cases reveals that the two camps have focused
on different doctrines and principles of law. On one hand,
those court opinions holding that the exclusions are unen-
forceable have emphasized public policy arguments for em-
powering the FDIC to recoup losses incurred in connection
with failed financial institutions. On the other hand, those
court opinions upholding the exclusions emphasize the par-
ties' freedom to contract, finding no public policy that nulli-
fies the regulatory exclusions.
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Cases Invalidating Regulatory Exclusions
The line of cases that has held that the regulatory exclu-
sions are invalid on public policy grounds began' with the
opinion in FDIC v. Oldenburg. Oldenburg arose out of a di-
rectors' and officers' liability policy issued by Federal Insur-
ance Company (Federal) to State Savings and Loan Associa-
tion (State Savings). After State Savings was declared
insolvent, the FSLIC, as receiver of State Savings, brought an
action against former officers and directors of State Savings.
The FSLIC sought a ruling that the directors' and officers' lia-
bility policy issued by Federal and State Savings provided
coverage for the pending claims against State Savings' former
officers and directors. In response, Federal asserted that the
claims against State Savings' officers and directors were
specifically excluded by Endorsement No. 2 of the policy. En-
dorsement No. 2 read as follows:
It is understood and agreed that the company shall not be liable to
make any payment for loss in connection with any claim made against
the directors or officers based upon or attributable to any claim, ac-
tion or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, any other similar organization, or any other national or
state bank, regulatory agency, whether such claim, action or proceed-
ing is brought in the name of such regulatory agency or by or on be-
half of such regulatory agency in the name of any other entity.'
The court was not persuaded by Federal's arguments that
the plain contractual language of the policy excluded the
FSLIC's claims and that the parties to the contract freely bar-
gained for the coverage provided by the terms of the policy.
2 In an earlier opinion in American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, 677 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Iowa
1987), the court denied summary judgment on the regulatory exclusion because the exclu-
sion was ambiguous. Still, the court implicitly recognized the validity of such exclusion by
stating: "If American Casualty had truly intended to exclude coverage for direct actions
against the officers and directors by the FDIC, it would have been a simple matter to say so
directly, rather than phrasing this exclusion in the cumbersome manner which it has." Id. at
604. This indicates that the court may have enforced an unambiguous regulatory exclusion.
In this case, the district court decided after trial that the exclusion was not ambiguous but
found coverage on other grounds. Later decisions also turned on contract construction,
rather than public policy considerations. See, e.g., American Casualty Co. v. FSLIC, 704 F
Supp. 898 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
3 671 F. Supp. 720 (D. Utah 1987).
4 Id. at 722.
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The court rejected these arguments by stating that it would
not allow a federally insured institution to bargain away the
rights of the FSLIC as receiver of that institution. The follow-
ing outlines the court's reasoning:
1. Through legislation and administrative rules, the
FSLIC, as receiver, succeeded to all rights of the failed
institution and was empowered to collect all debts of
the institution.
2. Because the institution's claims against the directors
would be covered, the FSLIC's claims should be covered.
3. The regulatory exclusions that deprive the FSLIC of a
right the institution had are contrary to statutes and
regulatory pronouncements and therefore violate pub-
lic policy.!
In reaching its conclusion, the court analogized to a case
where an exclusion in an automobile policy was not enforced
on the theory that it violated the state's safety responsibility
act requiring liability insurance.' However, the court did not
identify any statute that specifically required directors' and
officers' liability insurance. The only statutory provisions the
court referred to were those statutes that articulate "a strong
policy . . . that the FSLIC as receiver have all the rights and
claims that [the insured institution] would have had.".
This public policy argument was later adopted in FSLIC
v. Mmahat.8 In Mmahat, American Casualty Company
(American Casualty) moved for summary judgment seeking a
dismissal of the FSLIC's claims under the directors' and offi-
cers' liability policy issued by American Casualty. American
Casualty contended that no coverage was afforded because of
the application of either the insured-versus-insured exclusion'
or the regulatory exclusion in the policy.
5 Id. at 722-723.
6 Id. at 724.
7 Id. at 723.
8 Civ. A. No. 86-5160 (E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1988) (1988 VESTLAW 19304). This case has
been frequently cited by the FDIC.
9 The court concluded that the insured-versus-insured exclusion, which excluded claims
brought against one insured by another insured, was unenforceable. Id. at *1.
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The regulatory exclusion before the Mmahat court was
very similar to the regulatory exclusion in Oldenburg. Follow-
ing Oldenburg, the Mmahat court found that enforcement of
the exclusion would contravene public policy and impair the
FSLIC's statutorily imposed duties.'o Without explanation, the
court in Mmahat stated that it found the reasoning of the dis-
trict judge in Oldenburg to be persuasive."
In FSLIC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 2 the court re-
lied on Oldenburg for the rule that "[t]he FSLIC as receiver
of a failed institution has all the rights and powers of that in-
stitution."" Applying that rule, the court refused to enforce a
termination provision in an extended reporting endorsement
to a fidelity bond. 4 Under the terms of the endorsement, the
extended reporting period granted to the institution would
terminate upon takeover of the institution by a receiver, liq-
uidator, or any state or federal agency. Because the endorse-
ment purported to take away from the receiver a right that
the institution would have had had there been no receiver-
ship, it was struck down as a violation of public policy."
The public policy argument for invalidating regulatory
exclusions was later adopted in Branning v. CNA Insurance
Co.'6 There, the court concluded that the regulatory exclusion
hindered the FSLIC's exercise of its federal powers and there-
fore was contrary to federal policy." According to the court,
Congress in 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d) expressly authorized the
FSLIC to collect all obligations of the insured institution.
to Id. at *2.
11 Id. at *1. Subsequently in the same case, the district court on June 19, 1988, denied the
summary judgment filed by Mt. Hawley Insurance Co., the excess underwriters. The court
denied Mt. Hawley's motion for the same reasons set forth with respect to American Casu-
alty's motion.
12 701 E Supp. 1357 (E.D. Tenn. 1988).
13 Id. at 1363.
14 Id.
15 To this general statement the court adds the following dictum: "Had the agreement
provided that neither [the insured] nor the FSLIC could discover losses . . . then it would be
valid and enforceable as [the insured] would be bargaining its own rights, and the FSLIC's
rights as well." Id. This statement implies that the FSLIC could not acquire rights greater
than those of the insured.
16 721 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Wash. 1989).




The court cited Oldenburg for the proposition that "private
parties to an insurance contract may not frustrate the Con-
gressional purpose behind receivership by annulling FSLIC's
federal powers."1
In conclusion, cases that strike down the regulatory exclu-
sions on public policy grounds are emphasizing governmental
interests above private parties' rights to contract. Unfortu-
nately, the arguments do not identify specific legislative inten-
tions. Instead, they focus on the insurance policy as an asset of
the failed institution and federal legislation empowering the
FSLIC and the FDIC to marshal all assets of failed institutions.
Cases Enforcing Regulatory Exclusions
The public policy argument was criticized by the court in
Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen.20 In Continental Casualty,
the court noted that in order "[f]or contract provisions to be
void for public policy reasons, they may be injurious of [sic]
the public good or be subversive to sound morality."" After a
lengthy discussion, the court found that the regulatory exclu-
sions did not meet this requirement.' In Continental Casualty,
the court noted that there was no statutory insurance mini-
mum that the exclusion would violate.' Therefore, insurance
policies providing limited coverage when coverage or the
form of coverage is not required by statute do not violate
public policy.'
The opinion in Continental Casualty criticized cases such
as Oldenburg that relied on public policy arguments having
no backing in applicable law." The court pointed out the
weak reasoning of these opinions, which based public policy
arguments on congressional intent to allow the FSLIC to
"marshal and collect" assets of the failed institution.26 The
court recognized that in order to marshal an asset, it must
19 Id.
20 710 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
21 Id. at 1098 (citing Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 154 (1898)).







first exist.27 Because the institution did not own as an asset a
policy without the exclusion, the FDIC could not collect such
an asset.' The FDIC steps into the shoes of the institution,
whatever those shoes may be. On that basis, the Continental
Casualty court does not believe that the FDIC should be al-
lowed to step into shoes much larger than those worn by the
insolvent institution.
Other courts have followed Continental Casualty in re-
jecting the public policy arguments initially made in Olden-
burg. In FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,29 the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that provisions that termi-
nated coverage under bankers bonds "immediately upon the
taking over of an insured by a receiver or other liquidator or
by State of Federal officials" were valid, despite their effect
of precluding the FDIC from recovering under the bonds as
part of its receivership duties of marshaling the assets of the
failed bank."
The court in Aetna found the reasoning behind the
Oldenburg line of cases contrary to the U.S. Supreme
Court's established standards regarding public policy justifi-
cations for invalidating contracts." The Aetna court con-
cluded that there was no clear manifestation of public policy
that would support invalidating the terms of the bankers
bond.32 To the contrary, the court stated that the dominant
public policy is that the "parties' freedom of contract must
not be disturbed."33 In its opinion, the Aetna court noted
that legislation adopted by Congress in 1989 indirectly sup-
ported the validity of the regulatory exclusions. That legisla-
tion, included in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), has been
referred to in subsequent cases that have enforced the regu-
latory exclusions.34
27 Id. at 1099-1100.
2s Id. at 1100.
29 903 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1990).
30 Id. at 1077.
31 See id. at 1079.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1078.
34 See, e.g., American Casualty Co. v. Baker, 758 F Supp. 1340 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
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Recently, in American Casualty Co. v. FDIC,35 the attor-
neys for the insurance industry relied on this legislation and
argued that Congress, in enacting FIRREA, chose not to de-
clare that the regulatory exclusions were against public policy
interests. Evidently, this argument fell on receptive ears. In a
unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit summarily rejected the FDIC's public policy arguments
and affirmed the lower court ruling that the regulatory exclu-
sion was neither ambiguous nor against public policy. In a sin-
gle paragraph, the court simply stated that it found no error in
law or fact in the district court's analysis and conclusions3 6 and
that no good purpose would be served in repeating the discus-
sion.37 The appellate court also noted that the district court's
analysis and conclusions were in line with the vast majority of
the courts that have considered regulatory exclusions.'
The Eighth Circuit decision in American Casualty cou-
pled with the Ninth Circuit decision in Aetna has struck a real
blow to the FDIC's public policy arguments. Since the Sixth
Circuit opinion in Aetna, the FDIC has lost nearly every case
involving a regulatory exclusion." The FDIC has reacted to its
losses by asking Congress for legislative changes, including the
deletion of the proviso in Section 1821(d)(12)(a) of FIRREA
which is discussed later in this article.4 If the FDIC is success-
ful in changing provisions of FIRREA to effectively eliminate
regulatory exclusions, industry representatives predict that of-
ficers and directors for financial institutions face huge insur-
ance premiums, if they can get coverage at all.41
35 944 E2d 455 (8th Cir. 1991).
36 The district court in American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, Civ. No. 86-4018, slip. op. at 11-13
(N.D. Iowa 1990), rejected three public policy arguments made by the FDIC.
37 American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, 944 F.2d 455,460 (8th Cir. 1991).
38 Id.
39 According to the FDIC's Report on Directors' and Officers Liability Insurance and De-
pository Institution Bonds Pursuant to Section 220(b) (3) of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, at 15 (1991) (hereinafter FDIC Report), the FDIC
and FSLIC had initial success in litigation involving the exclusion. As of the date of the FDIC
Report, the government had lost fourteen of twenty-two cases involving the exclusions. Id.
The FDIC Report was written before the Eighth Circuit opinion in American Casualty.
40 See FDIC Report, note 39 supra, at 21.
41 See Rehm, "Plan May Lift Insurance Fees for Officers," Am. Banker, Sept. 30, 1991, at
9, col. 2 (quoting James McLaughlin, director of the American Bankers Association).
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Regulatory Exclusions After FIRREA
FIRREA was signed into law by President Bush on Au-
gust 9, 1989.42 The legislation overhauled the law affecting fi-
nancial institutions. In restructuring the regulatory frame-
work for financial institutions, FIRREA created the
Resolution Trust Corporation and dissolved both the FSLIC
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
FIRREA was enacted after the court's decision in Conti-
nental Casualty, where the court stated that "policies provid-
ing limited insurance, which are not required by statute or
mandated as to a form of coverage, are not invalidated on a
public policy argument."4 3 The legislative history clearly indi-
cates that the congressional legislators were aware of the
Continental Casualty decision." Still, the FIRREA legislation
did not mandate directors' and officers' coverage or expand
the government's powers with regard to the directors' and of-
ficers' policies.
With regard to the authority to enforce contracts,
FIRREA provides as follows:
The conservator or receiver may enforce any contract, other than a
directors' or officers' liability insurance contract or a depository in-
stitution bond, entered into by the depository institution notwith-
standing any provision of the contract providing for termination, de-
fault, acceleration, or exeicise of rights upon, or solely by reason of,
insolvency or the appointment of a conservator or receiver.s
In a report issued with FIRREA, the House Committee
on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs stated that FIRREA
confirmed the historic right of a conservator or receiver to en-
force any contract, notwithstanding certain provisions of the
contract, except for directors' and officers' liability insurance
contracts and financial institution bonds." The House report
states that legislation retained the current law for the treat-
42 Pub. L. No. 101-73, 101 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
43 Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen, 710 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
44 See 135 Cong. Rec. 510,198 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Garn).
45 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(12)(A) (1989).
46 H.R. Rep. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 127 (1989).
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ment of the provisions in directors' and officers' policies and
depository institution bonds. 47
After reviewing this legislative history, the court in Gary v.
American Casualty Co.' noted that it was clear that Congress
intended that the courts determine whether the regulatory ex-
clusions were contrary to public policy. Although Congress dis-
cussed invalidating regulatory exclusions, it refused to do so.4
Therefore, Congress has not indicated any public policy justify-
ing the invalidation of contract provisions in directors' and offi-
cers' liability policies. Rather than expanding the powers of the
FDIC, Congress chose to specifically exclude depository insti-
tution bonds and directors' and officers' liability policies from
FIRREA provisions allowing the FDIC to enforce contracts
regardless of provisions that are triggered by insolvency or ap-
pointment of a conservator or a receiver.'
Regulatory Exclusions in Legal Malpractice Policies
Despite the split of authority on enforceability of regulatory
exclusions or maybe because of it, many insurers are still includ-
ing regulatory exclusions in legal malpractice policies. Some in-
surers are using the exclusions nationwide." Other carriers are
using exclusions only in Texas, California, and other states expe-
riencing a large number of financial institution failures."
As noted above, there is no reported decision on the en-
forceability of these regulatory exclusions in legal malpractice
policies. Given the large number of policies that include such
47 Id
4 753 F Supp. 1547 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (appeal pending).
49 American Casualty Co. v. Baker, 758 F Supp. 1340, 1346 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
50 In FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 903 F2d 1073, 1078 (6th Cir. 1990), the court
noted that this choice was significant in light of Sharp v. FSLIC, 858 F2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1988).
In Sharp, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that under the language of the
bond form, the bond terminated immediately upon the commencement of the conservator-
ship. Therefore, the court refused to judicially rewrite the bond. According to the court, if
the FSLIC finds the coverage inadequate, it need only require the member institutions to
obtain bonds with additional provisions. See Sharp, 858 F2d at 1048.
5 See Himelstein, "Insurers Dodge S&L Claims Against Lawyers," Legal Times, Apr. 29,
1991, at 1 (referring to a nationwide campaign of malpractice insurance carriers).
52 See Gifford, "Risky Coverage of S&L Lawyers Spooks Insurers," Legal Times, Nov.
18, 1990, at 1 (noting that two of the largest malpractice carriers no longer cover legal work
for banks and savings and loan associations in certain states).
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exclusions and the volume of FDIC cases against attorneys,
the FDIC and the insurers are on a collision course.
A court that is asked to rule on the enforceability of a
regulatory exclusion in a legal malpractice policy may con-
sider the existing case law on regulatory exclusions. First, the
court may follow the trend of cases beginning with Continen-
tal Casualty and reject the public policy arguments. Even a
court that might be willing to apply the public policy argu-
ments to directors' and officers' liability policies should hold
that the public policy arguments made in the Oldenburg line
of cases have no applicability to legal malpractice policies.
First, the legal malpractice policy is not an asset of the fi-
nancial institution. This is important in light of the formula-
tion of public policy in Oldenburg, where the court refused to
enforce the exclusion of public policy grounds because the
predecessor institution should not be allowed to bargain away
rights of the FSLIC to carry out its statutory functions. In the
case of a legal malpractice policy, the predecessor institution
is not a party to the policy and therefore has no rights to bar-
gain away." While it is true that a third party may acquire
legally enforceable rights under a liability policy of another
once the insured's liability to a third party has been estab-
lished, this rule does not convert the attorneys' policy to an
asset of the institution before judgment.5 4 Given that legal
malpractice policies are not assets of financial institutions, the
regulatory exclusions do not frustrate the federal legislation
empowering the FDIC to marshal assets of failed institutions.
Therefore, a court should hold that the exclusions in legal
malpractice policies do not violate any public policy ex-
pressed in congressional legislation.
The court may then attempt to determine if regulatory
exclusions are contrary to some other public policy. As noted
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ritter v. Mutual Life Insurance
53 The FIRREA provisions that give the receiver the authority to enforce contracts do
not apply to attorneys' policies because the policies are not contracts with the institution.
54 With the exception of a few states, such as Louisiana, that have adopted direct action
statutes, normally a third party may not sue an insurer until after the third party has ob-




Co., in order for contractual provisions to be void for public
policy reasons they must be injurious to the public good or
subversive of sound morality. There is no indication that reg-
ulatory exclusions in legal malpractice policies meet this stan-
dard. The most often found violators of public policy are con-
tracts that induce criminal conduct or are contrary to
statutory law." With regard to state legislation, no state other
than Oregon" requires that attorneys maintain professional
liability insurance. In fact, the insurance regulators in several
states, including Florida, Illinois, New York, Maryland, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania, have granted approval of regulatory exclu-
sions in legal malpractice policies." This approval seems to in-
dicate that the arm of government charged with regulating in-
surance does not believe that the exclusions violate public
policy.
In discussing other expressions of public policy, the Texas
Commission of Appeals stated the following:
In the situation presented it is difficult to perceive harm to the pub-
lic in allowing able-minded men, dealing at arms' length, to contract
with reference to their own property.... An important requirement
of policy is "that men of full age and competent understanding shall
have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their contracts, when
entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and shall be
enforced by courts of justice" unless, perchance, contravention of
public right or welfare very clear appears."
In the case of an insurance policy between an insurer and
an insured attorney, "able-minded men, dealing at arms'
length" enter into the contract. Normally, attorneys are so-
phisticated insureds. Attorneys are in a position to compre-
hend the terms of their insurance policies and to appreciate
the consequences of regulatory exclusions. Therefore, after
the insured and insurer have entered into a contract with cer-
tain conditions and limitations, the FDIC should not be per-
55 169 U.S. 139, 154 (1898).
56 Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen, 710 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
57 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 9.080 (1989), which authorized the organization of a professional li-
ability fund. In Oregon, each attorney must contribute to the professional liability fund.
58 Himelstein, note 51 supra, at 18.
59 St. Regis Candles v. Hovas, 117 Tex. 313, 3 S.W.2d 429, 433-434 (1928).
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mitted to change the terms of the contract under the guise of
public policy.
It is well established that parties to an insurance contract
are entitled to make their own contracts in any legal form
they desire, so long as they do not offend some rule of law or
contravene public policy.' For the foregoing reasons, courts
should enforce unambiguous regulatory exclusions that are
not inconsistent with public policy clearly expressed in consti-
tutions, statutes, or common law.
Conclusion
The crisis the government faces with failed financial in-
stitutions does not justify disregarding of the terms of a con-
tract freely entered into by sophisticated insureds who under-
stand the limitations in their insurance policies. If the courts
ignore the clear intentions of the parties and declare the ex-
clusions unenforceable, the courts will, in effect, be rewriting
the contracts.
This judicial rewriting of insurance policies will harm
both the insureds and the general public by eliminating the
availability of insurance for persons who perform services for
financial institutions. If insurers cannot rely on the terms of
the policy, they will simply quit writing the insurance.' Like
the rich gambler who suddenly realizes that everyone is plot-
ting to clean him out, several major malpractice insurers have
already pulled out of the market.62
The courts must resist the FDIC's attempt to shift its
losses to private insurers. To do otherwise ignores the free-
dom of parties to make contracts for lawful purposes and
harms the public by forcing persons who perform work for
the financial institutions to "go bare" without insurance.
60 See generally 13 J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 7381, at 1-8 (1976).
61 See Himelstein, note 51 supra, at 19 (quoting Hector DeLeon, former general counsel
of the Texas State Board of Insurance, who stated that the best thing for insurers to do when
they do not know their ultimate exposure is not to write the insurance).
62 Gifford, note 52 supra, at 1.
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